

Security Handling of TALENT
Photography Acquired Over Cuba

1. This memorandum proposes a change in the security handling procedures regarding U-2 overflight photography acquired over Cuba.
2. U-2 overflight of Cuba was initiated some time prior to the Cuban invasion in order to provide intelligence for use therein. Because of the sensitivity of that operation, as well as the use of the U-2 for overflight of Cuba, a special compartment was established within the TALENT Control System. This compartment, known as ZEBUB, permitted only those who absolutely had to have it access to the materials.
3. Conditions are now changed. The invasion has occurred. Furthermore, conditions have been sufficiently confused that there is reasonable probability that low-flying aircraft may well have taken aerial photography over Cuba incident to the invasion.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCLANT are today required to be in a state of readiness in the event of any contingencies bearing upon our relations with Cuba. Current developments with regard to increments to the Cuban forces, their deployment, and defensive purposes, as well as developments in the vicinity of Guantanamo Naval Base are critical. The JCS has requested weekly coverage of selected targets in keeping with their responsibility. It is now proposed, because of the changed conditions and the present needs, that the ZEBUB special compartment be abolished and that the materials be afforded the protection of the TALENT Control System alone. This will permit considerably wider use of the material both in laboratories and in terms of users. It is further proposed that sanitization of this material be permitted in keeping with the procedure long established for U-2 photography in the document known as the "TALENT Sanitization Manual." It should be noted that photography released as SECRET NOFORN under these procedures would not on their face be attributable to the U-2. Unique diacritical marks on the

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film are eliminated, as well as any reference to the TALENT System. By enlargement it becomes impossible to deduce the altitude or the focal length whereby the photographs were acquired.

5. It is further proposed that information reports produced as a result of photo interpretation should be released as SECRET NOFORN, the information being attributed to reliable sources. Standard provision requests that in case of inquiry as to the source of either sanitized photography or sanitized information reference is made back to the CIA which has the responsibility for producing a logical source other than U-2 or fabricating a plausible source.

6. The military service have concurred in these proposals. General Cabell has been consulted and he proposes to authorize action as outlined in paragraphs 4 and 5 above provided the State Department concurs.

7. Recommendation: It is recommended that the State Department concur in the proposals for:

- a. The abolition of the ZEBUB System;
- b. The control of Cuban photography normally under the TALENT Control System with the application of the procedure of the TALENT Sanitization Manual; and
- c. The information resulting from photo interpretation to be authorized released at the SECRET NOFORN level.

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Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP92B01090R002600080113-7
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